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COMMENTS
Mind the Gap: Issues with and Solutions to Oklahoma’s
Appellate Jurisdiction as Exposed by Lockett v. Evans1
I. Introduction
In January 2014, Clayton Lockett and Charles Warner were scheduled
for execution by the State of Oklahoma. 2 As Lockett’s conviction stemmed
from a robbery, kidnapping, and murder in the summer of 1999 3 and
Warner’s originated with convictions of rape and first degree murder in
1997, 4 this appeared to mark the end of a long road for both men.
Apparently unprepared to concede the field, however, the two men
launched an appeal challenging the constitutionality of the state’s
confidentiality provision for death-penalty proceedings. 5 The controversial
appeal brought conversations about cruel and unusual punishment—and the
merits of the death penalty in general—to the forefront of observers’ minds
throughout Oklahoma and the nation.
Despite the uncontested importance of such well-publicized
humanitarian issues, a second aspect of the Lockett saga offers
comparative, albeit far more technical, significance. In its run through the
gamut of Oklahoma courts, the case exposed some shortcomings of the
state’s appellate system. Unlike most cases, the procedural history of this
case reads more akin to something out of a John Grisham novel.
Lockett and Warner initially challenged Oklahoma’s death-penalty
statute 6 on both state and federal constitutional grounds. 7 They also moved
for injunctive relief, seeking to stay their executions. 8 Because of the
federal claims, the case was temporarily removed to federal court, but an
amendment to the complaint left only challenges on state grounds, sending
the case back to state court. 9 The District Court of Oklahoma County then
heard the case, but denied the request for a stay of execution, claiming that
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals holds jurisdiction over such a
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

(Lockett 4), 2014 OK 34, 330 P.3d 488 (per curium).
Lockett v. State (Lockett 2), 2014 OK CR 3, ¶ 1, 329 P.3d 755, 755-56.
Lockett v. State (Lockett 1), 2002 OK CR 30, ¶¶ 1-3, 53 P.3d 418, 421.
Warner v. State, 2006 OK CR 40, ¶¶ 1-2, 144 P.3d 838, 856.
Lockett 2, ¶ 1, 329 P.3d at 755-56.
22 OKLA. STAT. § 1015(B) (2011).
Lockett 2, ¶ 1, 329 P.3d at 755-56.
Id.
Id.
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motion. 10 Lockett and Warner then filed a petition in error with the
Oklahoma Supreme Court, appealing the denial of the stay of execution. 11
The supreme court, however, affirmed the district court, ruling that only the
court of criminal appeals could hear the motion for the stay of execution,
although the supreme court could hear the merits of the action.12
While it would seem that the matter should be ripe for a decision on the
merits at this point, that was not yet the case. Although the District Court of
Oklahoma County ruled that the confidentiality clause did violate the
inmates’ state constitutional rights, it denied the rest of their claims. 13
Further, the court of criminal appeals denied Lockett and Warner’s
subsequent motion for a stay of execution, holding it had no authority to
grant the motion because there was no pending case before it.14 Therefore,
the petitioners brought another motion for a stay of execution before the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma. 15 But yet again, the supreme court kept the
substantive appeal and transferred the stay of execution issue to the court of
criminal appeals.16 Not to be outdone, the court of criminal appeals also
denied the stay of execution once more, claiming that the supreme court
“does not have the power to supersede a statute and manufacture
jurisdiction in [the court of criminal appeals] for [Lockett and Warner’s]
stay request by merely transferring it here.” 17
So by April 21, 2014, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma and the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had each refused to hear the motion
for a stay of execution twice, there was still a substantive appeal before the
supreme court, and the first execution was scheduled for the following day,
April 22. 18 The supreme court, noting the “awkward position” that the court
of criminal appeals had left it in, therefore reluctantly agreed to hear the
request for a stay of execution.19 The court granted the inmates a twelfthhour stay until the appeal of the constitutionality of the statute could be
heard. 20 Two days later, the supreme court issued a ruling on the merits and
10. Id.
11. Id. ¶ 2, 329 P.3d at 756-57.
12. Id.
13. Id. n.6, 329 P.3d at 756.
14. Id. ¶ 2, 329 P.3d at 756-57.
15. Id. ¶ 2, 329, P.3d at 757.
16. Id.
17. Id. ¶ 4, 329 P.3d at 758.
18. Lockett v. Evans (Lockett 3), 2014 OK 33, ¶ 6, 356 P.3d 58, 59-60 (per curium)
(mem. opin.).
19. Id. ¶ 13, 356 P.3d at 61.
20. Id. ¶ 15, 356 P.3d at 61.
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held that the inmates’ constitutional rights had not been violated, thus
dissolving the stay on the executions it had previously administered. 21
Regardless of whether this game of jurisdictional hot-potato reached the
correct end, there are significant issues with the means. The supreme court
recognized that it must either act without jurisdiction or deny Lockett and
Warner access to the courts for their claims; claims which the appellants’
lives truly depended on. 22 And while the supreme court by all accounts
chose the lesser of two evils by granting the stay of execution, in a properly
functioning judicial structure such a prisoner’s dilemma should never
enchain the courts.
Further, while this scenario has a particular flair for the dramatic, it is far
from the only situation where such a dilemma matters. While some assert
that “mercifully few” 23 of these jurisdictional conflicts arise, the fact is, as
shown above, that any time the supreme court and the court of criminal
appeals disagree about which court has jurisdiction, negative consequences
may follow. Moreover, regardless of the number of times these conflicts
occur, the ripples in their wake are large enough that they need to be
eliminated entirely. Most importantly, while perhaps the fact that there have
not been more conflicts is a testament to “the constant willingness of the
members of each Court to observe and comply with their jurisdictional
restrictions,” 24 foundational principles of democracy and fairness contend
that citizens should not have to rely on the goodwill of those with power to
make the right decisions, but rather demand that systematic checks are in
place. 25
This Comment thus contends that the system of appellate jurisdiction in
Oklahoma needs to be changed. Part II of the Comment gives an
explanation of the current state of appellate jurisdiction in Oklahoma. Part
III examines in more detail the issues with the current system and where
21. Lockett 4, 2014 OK 34, ¶ 20, 330 P.3d 488, 492 (per curium). And yet, even at this
point, the drama continues. See Bailey Elise McBride & Sean Murphy, Oklahoma Inmate
Dies After Execution Is Botched, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 30, 2014, 1:04 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20140430/us--oklahoma-double-execution/?utm_
hp_ref=travel&ir=travel.
22. See Lockett 3, ¶ 13, 356 P.3d at 61.
23. Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoena v. Dixon, 2008 OK 36, ¶ 5,
184 P.3d 546, 548.
24. Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals, 1978 OK 130, ¶ 1, 595 P.2d 416, 418.
25. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison) (arguing that it is not
enough that the Constitution merely separate the three branches of government on paper, to
be upheld by goodwill and fair play. Instead, actual powers must be given to each branch to
prevent the erosion of its power by another).
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they originate. Part IV argues why the problems found within the current
state of appellate jurisdiction warrant concern. Finally, Part V offers an
examination of potential solutions to the problem, and Part VI concludes.
II. Current System of Appellate Jurisdiction
Although additional intricacies have been added through statutes and
case law, the base of the Oklahoma system of appellate jurisdiction lies in
the Oklahoma State Constitution. While judges were originally chosen
through partisan elections, several bribery scandals in the 1960s led to the
amendment of article VII of the Oklahoma Constitution, the cornerstone of
judicial power in the state, in 1967.26 Of particular importance here, section
1 of article VII roots traditional civil and criminal judicial power in the
supreme court and the court of criminal appeals.27 Section 1 states that the
court of criminal appeals, while still continuing in effect, remains “subject
to the power of the legislature to change or abolish said Courts.”28
Presumably, this is because the court of criminal appeals was created by
statute in 1907. 29 Therefore, while article VII acknowledges the validity of
the court of criminal appeals, it does not bestow upon the court any more
power than it was originally conferred; the court’s authority still comes
from the legislature, not the constitution. And what the legislature giveth,
the legislature can taketh away.
Article VII defines the jurisdictional scope of the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma. 30 Namely, that the supreme court’s appellate jurisdiction
extends “to all cases at law and in equity.” 31 There is one critical exception
though: the court of criminal appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction in

26. Lesli E. McCollum, The Oklahoma Judiciary, in THE ALMANAC OF OKLAHOMA
POLITICS 1998, at 15, 22-23 (Gary W. Copeland et al. eds., 1998), http://ojs.library.okstate.
edu/osu/index.php/OKPolitics/article/view/1047/944.
27. See OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
28. Id.
29. 20 OKLA. STAT. § 40 (2011); History of the Court, OKLA. COURT OF CRIMINAL
APPEALS, http://www.okcca.net/History.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2017). This is made clearer
by the fact that the state’s original constitution does not list the court of criminal appeals as a
body in which the judicial power is vested. Oklahoma Constitution, OKLA. HIST. SOC’Y,
http://www.okhistory.org/research/okconstitution#page/27/mode/1up (last visited Mar. 10,
2017). Instead, the original article VII, section 2 gives the power to hear criminal appeals to
the supreme court until such time as a court of criminal appeals “shall be established by
law.” Id.
30. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
31. Id.
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criminal cases. 32 This puts Oklahoma in the rather unusual position of
having two courts of last resort. 33 Yet, as before, this grant of power to the
court of criminal appeals is not without loopholes: the constitution again
goes on to say that this exclusive jurisdiction given to the court of criminal
appeals only survives “until otherwise provided by statute.” 34 While the text
specifically notes that both the supreme court and the court of criminal
appeals have the power to issue remedial writs (such as writs of habeas
corpus, mandamus and certiorari for matters within their respective
jurisdiction), the text also makes clear that the supreme court retains
“general superintending control” over all inferior courts “created by law.” 35
Neither this section nor any other of Oklahoma’s constitution defines the
difference between civil and criminal matters. Yet the constitution does
recognize that in some cases the line between the two may not be bright.
Therefore, section 4 provides a method of resolution in the event that
conflicts arise between the two courts. 36 In such a case, the supreme court
shall decide where the matter should reside and that decision will be final.37
This power to determine jurisdiction is extensive, extending even beyond
conflicts in which the supreme court is involved. 38 This means that even
when the court of criminal appeals and another inferior court disagree over
jurisdiction, the supreme court can interject on its own accord and resolve
the issue. 39 One important, established limitation of this power is that when
civil claims depend on the outcome of a criminal claim wrapped up in the
same appeal, the civil claims cannot be litigated until the criminal matter is
disposed of. 40
In summation, the court of criminal appeals has jurisdiction over
everything that is criminal. Additionally, the supreme court has jurisdiction
over everything that is not criminal (thus, everything that is civil). Finally,
the supreme court resolves conflicts between the two. This means that the

32. Id.
33. See McCollum, supra note 26, at 17.
34. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
35. Id. And as the court of criminal appeals is created by law, it would seem to be
included in this category. See id.
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. See Jackson v. Freeman, 1995 OK 100, ¶ 9, 905 P.2d 217, 220 (holding the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma has the ability to determine jurisdictional complaints against
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals).
39. See id.
40. Smith v. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., 2001 OK 95, ¶¶ 8-10, 37 P.3d 872, 873-74.
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supreme court essentially defines what is civil and what is criminal.41
Specifically, the supreme court has held that the determination of such
jurisdictional issues “is not a legislative matter, but a constitutional issue to
be determined by this Court.” 42
Therefore, the supreme court, through its decisions, plays a large part in
determining the appellate structure in Oklahoma. The supreme court has
stated in multiple opinions that it makes such determinations on a “case-bycase basis.” 43 Case-by-case determinations typically rely on ad hoc
reasoning, meaning the decision is based purely on the individual facts of
that case "without consideration of wider application," as opposed to
applying a single hard-and-fast rule to all similar cases. 44 An examination
of several decisions where the supreme court resolved jurisdictional
conflicts based on the distinction between civil and criminal cases reveals
that this court's jurisprudence does in fact lack a hard-and-fast rule.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court began walking the civil/criminal tightrope
as early as 1927 in Dancy v. Owens. 45 At issue was whether the supreme
court or the court of criminal appeals had jurisdiction over writs of habeas
corpus. 46 There, the court promulgated a practical yet broad definition of
criminal cases, namely those which are “prosecuted in the name of the state
either by indictment or by information filed in a trial court.” 47 The court
stated that the “law of this state” clearly provides this definition, yet it
failed to cite any authority as to where that assertion originates. 48 The court
also distinguished between civil and criminal by stating that “[p]roceedings
to enforce civil rights are civil proceedings and proceedings for the
punishment of crimes are criminal proceedings.” 49 Therefore, a writ of
habeas corpus is a civil proceeding and within the jurisdiction of the
supreme court, because even though it arose out of a criminal case, it is “a
new suit brought by [the petitioner] to enforce a civil right . . . as against
41. See OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
42. In re M.B., 2006 OK 63, ¶ 8, 145 P.3d 1040, 1044.
43. Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoena v. Dixon, 2008 OK 36, ¶ 7,
184 P.3d 546, 549.
44. Ad hoc, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/diction
ary/ad%20hoc (last visited Sept. 17, 2016).
45. 1927 OK 203, 258 P. 879. Note that Dancy was decided before the amendments to
the Oklahoma Constitution in 1967, so the relevant portion is limited to their discussion of
what is criminal and civil, not their opening analysis of article 7, sections 1 and 2.
46. Id. ¶¶ 25-26, 258 P. at 884.
47. Id. ¶ 15, 258 P. at 882.
48. Id.
49. Id. ¶ 24, 258 P. at 885 (quoting Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 560 (1883).
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those who are holding him . . . under the criminal process.” 50 Therefore, at
least potentially under this reasoning, if a criminal defendant challenges the
constitutionality of the judicial process in some way, he is seeking to
enforce his civil rights. Thus, the appeal would be a civil matter under the
jurisdiction of the supreme court. Employed broadly, such a definition
could potentially put many more cases before the supreme court than the
court of criminal appeals.
The court further parsed the issue out by making an exception to its
previously stated rule, noting that contempt hearings, even though
involving punishment, are not criminal in nature.51 Indeed, “[c]ourts which
have no criminal jurisdiction can punish for so-called criminal contempt,
because the power to do so is inherent, and necessary to the efficiency and
very existence of the court.” 52 Therefore, jurisdiction simply lies in the
court in which the actions leading to the contempt sanction occurred.53
In 1990, almost sixty-five years later, in State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler,
the supreme court was confronted with the question of whether
amendments to an earned credits statute for inmates violated ex post facto
requirements if the amendments enhanced the sentence of a current
prisoner. 54 The court of criminal appeals argued that it did not have
jurisdiction because the process of applying earned credits to a sentence is
an administrative function that is separate from the underlying criminal
case. 55 Another argument that potentially could have been raised is that this
case demands resolution of a civil right, the right to be free from ex post
facto punishments, which merely arose from a criminal proceeding.
Therefore, the case would fit nicely within the framework of Dancy, and
thus be under the jurisdiction of the supreme court. Instead, the court stated
that “[c]learly questions pertaining to the length of sentences and credit
time for reduction of those sentences belong in the Court of Criminal
Appeals.” 56 And although the court briefly cites to Dancy in making an
ancillary point, it makes no effort to distinguish or explain the opposite
outcomes, so it is unclear whether this outcome is better characterized as an

50. Id. (quoting Tom Tong, 108 U.S. at 560).
51. Id. ¶ 30, 258 P. at 885.
52. Id. ¶ 31, 258 P. at 885 (quoting Smith v. State ex rel. Gallaher, 1916 OK CR 80, 159
P. 941, 943).
53. Id.
54. 1990 OK 3, ¶ 1, 786 P.2d 82, 83.
55. Id. ¶ 10, 786 P.2d at 84-85.
56. Id. ¶ 15, 786 P.2d at 86.
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exception for issues of sentencing or an overhaul of the Dancy
framework. 57
The court returned to its Mahler rationale again eleven years later in
Smith v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections. 58 There, a former inmate
disputed fees that she paid over her two-year period of supervised
probations. 59 The court found the fees were “a condition of her probation
and thus, her sentence.” 60 Therefore, since the length or amount of the
petitioner’s punishment was essential to the issue, it is “clearly with in [sic]
the Court of Criminal Appeals’ exclusive jurisdiction.” 61
The next context in which the dispute arose before the supreme court
was whether an individual should be tried as a juvenile or an adult in In re
M.B. 62 Yet there, the court did not examine the substance of the claim as it
did in Dancy by looking at whether the appeal asserted a civil right or not.
Instead, the court looked to the origins of the procedural scenario that led to
the appeal, asserting that the appeal “arose out of a criminal case” and
therefore belonged in the court of criminal appeals.63 This new
understanding of how to determine jurisdiction puts far more weight on the
side of the court of criminal appeals than the court’s previous methods; this
template gives the court of criminal appeals jurisdiction over any appeal
that originated with the prosecution of an individual under the criminal
code, even if that individual now asserts a civil right. Again, the court made
this shift without attempting to reconcile Dancy. 64
The supreme court moved back toward the Dancy rationale, however, in
Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoena v. Dixon, which
analyzed the jurisdiction of an appeal regarding a grand jury’s power to
issue a subpoena. 65 Following the framework of In re M.B., it would seem
that any matter involving a grand jury arises out of a criminal case and thus
belongs in the court of criminal appeals. Yet, the court here returned to
classifying the type of substantive appeal actually before it, as in Dancy. 66
Specifically, the court noted that if an appeal involving a grand jury raises
issues of criminal procedure, then the appeal would fall within the
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. ¶ 12, 786 P.2d at 85.
2001 OK 95, 37 P.3d 872.
Id. ¶¶ 2-3, 37 P.3d at 873.
Id. ¶ 8, 37 P.3d at 873-74.
Id. ¶ 10, 37 P.3d at 874.
2006 OK 63, ¶¶ 1-2, 145 P.3d 1040, 1041-42.
Id. ¶ 14, 145 P.3d at 1047.
See M.B., 2006 OK 63, 145 P.3d 1040.
2008 OK 36, ¶ 1, 184 P.3d 546, 547-48.
Id. ¶¶ 9-11, 184 P.3d at 549.
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jurisdiction of the court of criminal appeals.67 Whereas the question in
Dixon only required a “generalized analysis of constitutional and statutory
norms,” thus the case was properly situated before the supreme court.68
Similarly, in Movants to Quash Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued in
Multicounty Grand Jury v. Powers, the court assumed jurisdiction over a
dispute involving a grand jury. 69 The court noted, however, as in Dixon,
that jurisdiction regarding a grand jury could potentially go either way, to
the supreme court or the court of criminal appeals, depending on the
specific issue involved. 70 There, the deciding factor that gave the supreme
court jurisdiction was not that the case was civil or criminal in nature, but
rather that it was “a matter of broad public concern.” 71
The supreme court further complicated the plot in Leftwich v. Court of
Criminal Appeals. 72 Leftwich sought to limit the court of criminal appeals’
ability to interpret the Oklahoma Constitution, presumably because she was
aware of the holding in In re M.B. as mentioned above. 73 The supreme
court, however, declined to assume jurisdiction and refused to address the
jurisdictional issue. 74 It did so, however, not because the appeals were in
any way criminal in nature, but because the parties agreed that the issues
were not adequately raised before the court of criminal appeals, and that
their interpretation of the Oklahoma Constitution was erroneous.75 This
seems especially strange given the protective nature the supreme court has
previously demonstrated over its role as the only body able to determine
jurisdiction under the Oklahoma Constitution. 76 Because of this, several
judges dissented from the majority. The reasoning of each differed, but all
of the three dissenters agreed that the court should have at least asserted its
authority to decide the jurisdictional issue.77
67. Id. ¶ 10, 184 P.3d at 549.
68. Id. ¶ 11, 184 P.3d at 549.
69. 1992 OK 142, ¶ 2, 839 P.2d 655, 656.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 2011 OK 80, 262 P.3d 750.
73. Id. ¶¶ 1-2, 262 P.3d at 750; see also In re M.B., 2006 OK 63, ¶ 8, 145 P.3d 1040,
1044-45.
74. Leftwich, ¶¶ 3-4, 262 P.3d at 750-51.
75. Id. ¶ 2, 262 P.3d at 750.
76. Compare this attitude to State ex rel. Henry v. Mahler, 1990 OK 3, ¶ 2, 786 P.2d 82,
83, in which the supreme court refused to dismiss a jurisdictional conflict as moot just
because the court of criminal appeals had denied jurisdiction over the matter.
77. Leftwich, 2011 OK 80, 262 P.3d 750 (Winchester, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part, positing that the court should have dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to
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But, while the court’s decision in Leftwich leaves much to be desired,78
their end result is not without precedent.79 In Hinkle v. Kenny, the supreme
court agreed to leave statutory construction, and even constitutional
analysis, in the hands of the court of criminal appeals. 80 It did so because
the legislature had created the court of criminal appeals, pursuant to article
VII, section 4 of the Oklahoma Constitution. 81 The supreme court chose to
do so, not because it was powerless to interpret such statutes itself-even
criminal ones—but because it is their “policy, deliberately adopted, of
avoiding a conflict of opinions and decisions between the two courts.” 82 In
other words, the supreme court could hear such issues, but would rather not.
Again, this seems to be analysis after the heart of In re M.B., where the
supreme court is not worried that the court of criminal appeals is hearing
civil issues, as long as they arose from a criminal case.83
Finally, and most recently, in 2015 the Oklahoma Supreme Court
decided Dutton v. City of Midwest City, an appeal of the legal correctness of
the petitioner’s convictions and sentence for assault, public intoxication,
and domestic assault and battery. 84 There, the supreme court gave a much
more detailed analysis of why it refused to adopt jurisdiction, listing four
ways in which the petitioner failed to show that the court should have
jurisdiction over the petitioner’s request to have his previous convictions
invalidated. 85 First, the petitioner failed to show why the substantive claim
was a civil cause of action as opposed to criminal, meaning a cause of
action involving “personal criminal liability, defenses thereto, and the
imposition and execution of a criminal sentence.” 86 Second, the petitioner
failed to show the claim was based on institutional deficiencies separate
from the underlying criminal cause of action.87 Third, the petitioner did not
review the court of criminal appeals in an undisputed criminal matter) (Watt, J., dissenting,
arguing that the supreme court should assert original jurisdiction and prevent the state from
pursuing charges under the current statute) (Reif, J., dissenting, stating that the court should
assume original jurisdiction because the case presents a matter of significant public interest).
78. The main reason why the majority’s stance is so difficult to decipher is that their
opinion spans a mere four paragraphs. See id.
79. Albeit, a cite to which is not given within their four paragraphs.
80. 1936 OK 582, ¶ 10, 62 P.2d 621, 622.
81. Id. ¶ 9, 362 P.2d at 622.
82. Id. ¶ 12, 62 P.2d at 623.
83. See In re M.B., 2006 OK 63, ¶¶ 13-14, 145 P.3d 1040, 1047.
84. 2015 OK 51, ¶¶ 2-3, 353 P.3d 532, 536.
85. Id. ¶ 20, 353 P.3d at 540-41.
86. Id. ¶ 20, 353 P.3d at 540.
87. Id. ¶ 20, 353 P.3d at 540-41.
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claim that the court of criminal appeals had acted in excess of its
authority. 88 Finally, the petitioner did not show that there was concurrent
civil jurisdiction for any reason in the supreme court in addition to a
criminal proceeding in another court. 89 Again, this analysis is essentially
based upon whether the underlying substantive issue is a civil or criminal
one.
The supreme court further explained its reasoning on the difference
between civil and criminal matters. Specifically, the court noted that
criminal claims include those that are “previously brought by a criminal
defendant when using the form of a common-law writ to challenge his or
her criminal judgment and sentence.”90 Therefore, unlike the supreme court
had previously held, merely seeking a writ that can be issued by the
supreme court “does not transform a criminal matter into a civil matter.” 91
Instead, the court must look to the petitioner’s substantive claims to
determine whether they are criminal or civil.92
In short, four things about the appellate jurisdiction in Oklahoma are
clear: (1) the supreme court has jurisdiction over civil matters; 93 (2) the
court of criminal appeals has jurisdiction over criminal matters; 94 (3) the
supreme court has the final authority to determine which court has
jurisdiction; 95 and (4) these decisions are made on an ad hoc, case-by-case
basis. 96 Such determinations eschew neat and clean categorization by their
nature, but by examining the above opinions, rough categories begin to
appear.
As noted throughout the above paragraphs, there are essentially two
different categories of analysis that the supreme court has used to make its
decisions in jurisdictional matters. The first is that found in Dancy, the
“type of appeal” category, which analyzes which court should have
jurisdiction with respect to the type of substantive law that the appeal is
based on. 97 The second is derived from In re M.B., the “origin” category,
which analyzes which court the underlying appeal arose out of, regardless
88. Id. ¶ 20, 353 P.3d at 541.
89. Id.
90. Id. ¶ 21, 353 P.3d at 541 (emphasis omitted).
91. Id. ¶ 21, 353 P.3d at 542.
92. Id.
93. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoena v. Dixon, 2008 OK 36, ¶ 7,
184 P.3d 546, 548.
97. See Dancy v. Owens, 1927 OK 203, ¶ 26, 258 P. 879, 884.
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of the type of substantive law involved. 98 Of those analyzed in this
Comment, the court is relatively split in its use of the two categories,
employing the former in four cases 99 and the latter in three, 100 while two
cases use a concoction that could well be placed in either category. 101
Further, there is no clear shift or pattern in the court’s preference for a
particular category over time. 102 Even a cursory glance through this case
law shows that the doctrine is confusing, convoluted, and conflicting. But
this revelation is not new to the supreme court. In fact, in Dixon, the court
concedes outright that when these cases are examined in light of each other
“[t]he results can be confusing.” 103 Yet the supreme court does not see this
as a negative. Rather, it asserts that its case-by-case method of
determination is superior because “a hard-and-fast rule would not serve the
ends of justice.” 104 In looking at the broader picture, however, this assertion
seems difficult to support.
III. The Problem
The current system of appellate jurisdiction in Oklahoma, as explained in
the previous section, differs from the typical way other states or the federal
government approach the same issue.105 While there is nothing inherently
wrong with this, and in fact it is most likely a positive trait,106 Lockett
reveals that there are some problems with the system in practice. This part
98. See In re M.B., 2006 OK 63, ¶ 13, 145 P.3d 1040, 1047.
99. See Dutton v. City of Midwest City, 2015 OK 51, ¶ 21, 353 P.3d 532, 541-42;
Dixon, ¶¶ 10-11, 184 P.3d at 549-50; Movants to Quash Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued in
Multicounty Grand Jury v. Powers, 1992 OK 142, ¶ 2, 839 P.2d 655, 656; Dancy, ¶ 13, 258
P. at 882.
100. See Leftwich v. City of Midwest City, 2011 OK 80, ¶¶ 3-4, 262 P.3d 750, 750;
M.B., ¶ 14, 145 P.3d at 1047; Hinkle v. Kenny, 1936 OK 582, ¶ 12, 62 P.2d 621, 622-23.
101. See Smith v. Okla. Dep't of Corr., 2001 OK 95, ¶ 10, 37 P.3d 872, 874; State ex rel.
Henry v. Mahler, 1990 OK 3, ¶ 12, 786 P.2d 82, 85.
102. In fact, when the seven clearer cut cases are put together chronologically, they
alternate perfectly: Dancy, 1927 OK 203, 258 P. 879 (Type); Hinkle, 1936 OK 532, 62 P.2d
621 (Origin); Powers, 1992 OK 142, 839 P.2d 655 (Type); In re M.B., 2006 OK 63, 145 P3d
1040 (Origin); Dixon, 2008 OK 36, 184 P.3d 546 (Type); Leftwich, 2011 OK 80, 262 P.3d
750 (Origin); Dutton, 2014 OK 51, 353 P.3d 532 (Type).
103. Dixon, 2008 OK 36, n.1, 184 P.3d at 548.
104. Id.
105. See McCollum, supra note 26, at 15-17.
106. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 306-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that denial of the right of the states to experiment in economic and
social issues might be costly; interestingly enough, the case also involved an Oklahoma
law).
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will first examine other potential situations where problems similar to
Lockett could arise, producing suboptimal scenarios. Second, it will show
why these scenarios should be considered suboptimal, although that
assertion is further developed in Part IV. Finally, it will begin to explore
precisely where in the current system these problems originate from.
A. Scenarios
In an instance of jurisdictional conflict between the Oklahoma Supreme
Court and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, there are many
different possible outcomes. The one constant, however, is that the supreme
court will make the decision. 107 In such a scenario, the supreme court has
two initial options: (1) keep the case or (2) transfer it to the court of
criminal appeals. So, logically, if the supreme court follows the first option
and decides to keep the case, there are two possible outcomes or scenarios.
Scenario One
The conflict involves a case “at law [or] in equity.”108 In this case, the
supreme court should indeed have jurisdiction, making this an optimal
outcome.
Scenario Two
The conflict involves a “criminal case[].” 109 This scenario is a complex
one, as the supreme court has, on one hand, violated a provision of the
Oklahoma Constitution as shown above by taking a criminal case. 110 But on
the other hand, the supreme court is authorized to “determine which court
has jurisdiction and such determination shall be final.” 111 One would hope
that the supreme court would refrain from making such a decision in an
obvious case. But in a close call with honest intentions, the supreme court
would still infringe upon the jurisdiction of the court of criminal appeals
without recourse. For reasons developed further below, this is a suboptimal
outcome.
The second initial option before the supreme court is to transfer the
matter to the court of criminal appeals. In this instance there are five new
potential scenarios or outcomes.

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Scenario Three
The court of criminal appeals accepts the case. If the case involves a
criminal matter, then the court of criminal appeals rightly has
jurisdiction. 112 This is merely the inverse of Scenario One, and is thus also
an optimal outcome.
Scenario Four
The court of criminal appeals again accepts the case. If the case in fact
does not involve a criminal matter, however, then the supreme court should
have jurisdiction. 113 This is the inverse of Scenario Two, and thus by the
same rationale is a suboptimal outcome.
Scenario Five
The court of criminal appeals refuses to accept the case, and then the
supreme court concedes to hear it. Albeit lacking several intermediary
steps, this is essentially the Lockett scenario. As the supreme court would
now be hearing a case that it previously determined it did not have
jurisdiction over, this is a suboptimal outcome.
Scenario Six
The court of criminal appeals refuses to accept the case, the supreme
court refuses to take the case back, and then the court of criminal appeals
concedes to hear it. This is Scenario Five in the inverse, with the court of
criminal appeals now hearing a case that it previously determined it did not
have jurisdiction over, rather than the supreme court. There is an argument
that this outcome is optimal because the supreme court has the ability to
make final determinations, and so the court of criminal appeals’
determination should not matter.114 But since the court of criminal appeals
is nevertheless hearing a case it believes it has no jurisdiction over and has
issued some sort of opinion or order to that effect, this is still a suboptimal
outcome.
Scenario Seven
The court of criminal appeals refuses to accept the case, and the supreme
court refuses to take the case back. If neither court gives in, there will
eventually be a point of no return, and either the rights of the parties in the
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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case at issue will become moot, or they will give up. This essentially leads
to a denial of the rights of the parties in a decision that is not based on the
merits of the case. Imagine if in Lockett, for example, the supreme court in
its memorandum opinion on April 21, 2014, once again asserted that the
case should be before the court of criminal appeals instead of taking up the
appeal. In that case, the inmates would have been executed on the mornings
of April 22 and 29, without their appeal being heard. 115 Again, this is a
suboptimal outcome.
Therefore, in summary, whenever a jurisdictional conflict arises between
the supreme court and the court of criminal appeals, there are seven
possible outcomes. Of these seven, only two are optimal (Scenarios One
and Three). The remaining five are all suboptimal (Scenarios Two, Four,
Five, Six, and Seven). Of the suboptimal scenarios, there are three different
categories of reasons why the individual scenario is less than desirable. The
first is that the scenario involves one of the courts infringing upon the
express jurisdiction of the other as delineated in the constitution (Scenarios
Two and Four). 116 The second is where the court that ultimately decides the
case has previously stated in an opinion, order, or other pronouncement that
it had no jurisdiction over the matter (Scenarios Five and Six). The third
and final category is where each court declines to take the case, resulting in
a de facto denial of the appeal (Scenario Seven).
B. Why Suboptimal
All three of these categories raise concerns for the structure of the
judicial branch as a whole. While there is some overlap, however, the
concerns vary in both type and degree among the different categories.
Therefore, each category is discussed individually in more detail below.
1. Jurisdictional Infringement (Scenarios Two and Four)
Typically, state courts are courts of general jurisdiction. 117 This means
that the court can hear any case brought before it “unless a showing is made
to the contrary.” 118 In Oklahoma, however, both the Oklahoma Supreme
Court and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals are courts of limited

115. Lockett 3, 2014 OK 33, ¶ 6, 356 P.3d 58, 59-60 (per curium) (mem. opin.).
116. See OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
117. 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3522 (3d
ed. 2008).
118. Id.
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jurisdiction, as stipulated by the Oklahoma Constitution. 119 This makes
these Oklahoma courts, for purposes of this discussion, more similar to
federal courts than other state courts, as federal courts are also of limited
jurisdiction. 120
The importance of a court having limited jurisdiction is that there are
basic structural restrictions in place, the breaking of which is “no mere
technical violation” but rather “an unconstitutional usurpation” of power
not granted to the court.121 This means that when the Oklahoma Supreme
Court hears a criminal case, it is not merely failing being a good chum to its
sister court. Instead, whether willingly or not, it is usurping its express,
delineated jurisdiction and violating the foremost authority of the State of
Oklahoma. 122 In turn, when this decision is made outside of the authority
granted to the court by elected representatives in the legislature, democratic
power is taken from the hands of Oklahoma citizens. 123
Of course, there is a further complication here as the Oklahoma
Constitution grants the supreme court the power to have the final say in
whether a matter is civil or criminal.124 Therefore, the question is fairly
raised whether it is possible for the Oklahoma Supreme Court to exercise
power outside of its jurisdiction when it decides the line at which its
jurisdiction stops in actuality or only in theory. Such an usurpation of
power, however, is very much an actual threat.
It is true that the definitional boundary between what is criminal and
what is civil is often blurry; indeed, this is why the authors of Oklahoma’s
constitution included a provision for deciding precisely such jurisdictional
disputes. 125 So in a close call, the supreme court trumps. Nevertheless,
assuredly occasions arise where it would simply be wrong for the supreme
court to assert jurisdiction. Examples abound. Any appeals regarding issues
of evidence, sentencing, or substantive criminal law surely belong in this
119. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4 (stating that the Oklahoma Supreme Court does not have
jurisdiction over criminal cases); 20 OKLA. STAT. § 40 (2011) (granting the court of criminal
appeals jurisdiction over criminal matters).
120. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 117, § 3522 (stating that federal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction, and thus can only hear cases that are within the grant of the judicial
power from the Constitution, and have been supplied by Congress).
121. Id.
122. Namely of course, OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
123. Dustin E. Buehler, Solving Jurisdiction’s Social Cost, 89 WASH. L. REV. 653, 660
(2014).
124. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
125. See id. (“[I]n the event there is any conflict as to jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
shall determine which court has jurisdiction and such determination shall be final.”).
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category. Even if the supreme court asserted jurisdiction over such cases—
leaving the court of criminal appeals with no recourse—that would surely
be unconstitutional. Despite the fact that the supreme court is the final
arbiter, it simply does not have jurisdiction over criminal matters.126
And indeed, this should be a constitutional violation. This is made clear
by the fact that the Oklahoma Constitution, while granting the supreme
court a wide array of authority, does not go so far as giving it general
jurisdiction, or giving it authority to determine its own limits to
jurisdiction. 127 Therefore, the supreme court has authority to determine its
own jurisdiction within boundaries provided by the Oklahoma Constitution.
Thus, it can violate this mandate, and can do so obviously at the extremes.
The problem is, in a close-call case, the court can violate the constitution
silently, by hearing a case that should be criminal. This can happen without
anyone (the court of criminal appeals, the litigants, or even the supreme
court itself) being aware it has done so.
2. Previous Opinion or Order Denying Jurisdiction (Scenarios Five and
Six)
All of the issues above are implicated in this particular situation as well,
with one exception: the constitutional violation that occurs when a court
hears a case it has jurisdiction over is no longer silent. Above, where the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has never spoken to whether a particular issue
falls within its jurisdiction or the jurisdiction of the court of criminal
appeals, the validity of its decision necessarily involves line-drawing of a
blurry and unclear definition.
In this situation however, there has been an additional step. Because the
supreme court (or court of criminal appeals) has already spoken to the
jurisdictional issue, any lack of clarity is removed. The court has no
jurisdiction, a fact supported by the constitution and the jurisprudence of
the supreme court.128 Therefore, it is clear that they have no jurisdiction.
Choosing to exercise it is therefore problematic for all the same reasons
mentioned in the preceding section.
3. De facto Denial of the Appeal (Scenario Seven)
Here, neither court would choose to act, eventually leading to the case
being disposed of. This is problematic because the case would not be
determined on its merits. And while it is generally thought to be preferable
126. Id.
127. See id. §§ 1, 4.
128. Id. § 4.
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to decide a case on its merits rather than procedural deficiencies,129 this is
definitely true here as the procedural deficiency is beyond the individual
parties’ control. Rather, the result would be from a lack of any court
wanting to assume jurisdiction over the matter.
In Lockett, when faced with this decision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
found that this alternative would violate article II, section 6 of the
Oklahoma Constitution.130 This section provides that the courts will be
open to every person and assures them a “certain remedy afforded for every
wrong.” 131 The court seems correct in concluding that this section implies
that all citizens have a right of access to the courts, meaning that they must
be given an opportunity to be heard. 132 This conclusion led the Lockett
court to hear the case rather than violate this constitutional right.133 And
while the Lockett court perhaps was correct in choosing the lesser of two
evils, 134 the fact of the matter is that both options were less than ideal, with
each potentially resulting in a constitutional violation.135 This is a situation
which should never occur in a properly functioning system.
C. Origin of Problems
If the system indeed is problematic, then it needs to be corrected. But,
merely stating that a car is broken is not enough for a mechanic to fix it.
The mechanic first needs to know whether the problem is due to the engine
or the transmission before he or she can make the car run properly again.
Similarly, it must be identified what exactly it is within Oklahoma’s
appellate system that makes these problems occur; a solution cannot be
designed until it is clear what must be addressed. As above, the problems
can be organized according to the different scenarios.
First, Scenarios Five, Six, and Seven occur when the supreme court and
the court of criminal appeals disagree about which court has jurisdiction.
Therefore, these problems emanate from whatever in the system allows the
two courts to disagree. Namely, this stems from the fact that the supreme
court has the ability to arbitrate jurisdiction between the two.136 This leaves
129. Edward F. Sherman, Dean Pound’s Dissatisfaction with the “Sporting Theory of
Justice”: Where Are We a Hundred Years Later?, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 983, 997 (2007).
130. See Lockett 3, 2014 OK 33, ¶ 13, 356 P.3d 58, 61 (per curium) (mem. opin.).
131. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6.
132. See Lockett 3, ¶ 13, 256 P. 3d 58, 61.
133. Id. ¶ 14, 356 P.3d at 61.
134. The relatively indirect constitutional violation of exerting authority not granted to it
by the constitution or the legislature against the direct denial of rights to citizens.
135. See OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6.
136. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
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the court of criminal appeals in an awkward, hybrid sort of position
between being a court of last resort for all criminal matters and still being
clearly inferior to the supreme court.
Second, Scenarios Two and Four occur when either court takes
jurisdiction where it should not, which is problematic for reasons explained
above. This alone, however, is hard to stop and is a problem faced by all
courts on every level, as it would be impossible to prevent this while also
allowing courts to determine their own jurisdiction. Therefore, there will
likely always be at least some inherent risk. Typically, this is handled by
checks on judicial power from other branches—namely, that the judiciary
has neither the sword nor the purse, so if they make a decision beyond the
bounds of their authority, the executive branch and the legislature may
choose not to enforce or give weight to the decision.137 In Oklahoma,
however, there is the additional problematic possibility of “silent
violations” by the supreme court, as discussed above, when they make
decisions.
Both of these situations, therefore, seem to stem from the supreme court
being the final arbiter of jurisdiction. This is further compounded by the
confusion resulting from the supreme court’s jurisprudence, despite its
assertions to the contrary. 138 Surely there needs to be some flexibility, as the
supreme court acknowledges. Yet, here it comes at the cost of clarity. If the
supreme court consistently used a clearer standard to make jurisdictional
decisions, then the court of criminal appeals could analyze on its own
before rejecting or accepting jurisdiction, raising the odds greatly that the
two courts will agree instead of disagree. That would also keep the supreme
court honest: if it made a decision out of line with that standard, the court of
criminal appeals, the executive branch, and the legislature would have
grounds to ignore the opinion.
IV. Why It Matters
These problems with the current system of appellate jurisdiction are not
merely theoretical or abstract; they have lasting impacts upon how justice is
dispensed in Oklahoma. In particular, there are three broader areas affected
by these problems: efficiency, control of the case by litigants, and the Rule
of Law.

137. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 450 (Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass’n ed., 2009).
138. Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoena v. Dixon, 2008 OK 36, ¶ 7,
n.1, 184 P.3d 546, 548-49.
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A. Efficiency
In making jurisdictional decisions, courts commonly adopt one of two
contrasting perspectives. First, courts may focus on the structural concerns
that arise when a court exercises jurisdiction where it should not. These
courts are acutely aware of the importance of respecting their constitutional
or statutory boundaries, finding that “‘no amount of “prudential reasons” or
perceived increases in efficiency’ can justify adjudication when jurisdiction
does not exist.” 139 By contrast, under the second perspective, courts may
consider the massive amount of waste that occurs when cases are dismissed
for jurisdictional purposes, especially late in the process. 140 Courts that
adopt this perspective might be more willing to blur the lines and exercise
jurisdiction in questionable situations in order to ensure that the litigants
receive an opportunity to be heard on the merits of their case.
Yet neither structural concerns nor efficiency can be viewed in isolation,
as both are implicated by nonwaivable jurisdictional rules; instead there
must be a balance between the two. 141 Therefore, focusing on the structural
component to the exclusion of efficiency concerns still leads to suboptimal
results. 142 This applies to the current structure of the appellate jurisdiction
in Oklahoma.
The problem is clear when Scenario Seven is examined, the situation
where neither court wants to take jurisdiction, constituting a de facto denial
of the case. Placing aside the concerns over lack of court access and looking
only at the structural issue of whether either the Oklahoma Supreme Court
or Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has exercised power which it does
not have, this scenario comes out well. Indeed, both courts have played
their hands conservatively, but the bottom line is that the supreme court has
obviously not heard a criminal case and the court of criminal appeals has
clearly not heard a civil case. Thus, each has acted within its constitutional
bounds. 143
Yet this is likely small consolation to the parties, as no amount of
technical legal propriety can bring back "their sunk litigation costs.” 144 By
this point, the parties have already either hired new lawyers or retained their
old, and put forth, at a minimum, the costs of filing an appeal and quite
139. Buehler, supra note 123, at 660 (quoting Dow Jones & Co. v. Ablaise Ltd., 606 F.3d
1338, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
140. Id. at 661.
141. Id. at 664.
142. See id. at 660-64.
143. See OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
144. Buehler, supra note 123, at 664.
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likely a good deal more than that.145 If we accept the definition of
inefficient as “not capable of producing desired results without wasting
materials, time, or energy,” 146 then this seems to fit the bill. Materials, time,
and energy were all spent, and the desired result of having the appeal heard
on the merits has not been produced.
Moreover, this means that even if the Oklahoma Supreme Court makes a
choice that stays within its constitutional bounds, allows the court of
criminal appeals to do the same, and the litigants are heard on the merits of
their case (as is the case in Scenarios One and Three), these structurally
optimal results can still quickly be turned suboptimal. This is exemplified
by the long, complex procedural history in Lockett. 147 Assuming that the
Oklahoma Supreme Court is in fact the court that should have ultimately
heard the appeal (thus making it constitutionally proper and clearly fitting
within the range of Scenario One), Lockett and Warner first made a filing
for the matter on February 26, 2014. 148 Yet the supreme court did not
decide to fully assert its jurisdiction until April 21, 2014. 149 This means that
for nearly two full months, the case was in jurisdictional limbo, while a
bevy of motions, briefs, and hearings occurred before multiple courts, not to
mention the rising legal fees.150 And this must assuredly be one of the
faster, more efficient examples in Oklahoma, as the court was operating
under an all-too-literal deadline. 151
But even so, this situation fails to meet the mark of efficiency. 152 While
it is true that this time around the desired results were accomplished, it was
not done without waste. The impossibly convoluted sidebar that occurred
over the two months before the Oklahoma Supreme Court accepted

145. Id. at 655-56.
146. Inefficient, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dic
tionary/inefficient (last visited Sept. 1, 2016).
147. Lockett 2, 2014 OK CR 3, ¶ 1, 329 P.3d 755, 755 (noting that the recent procedural
history of the case is “lengthy and requires repeating for clarity”).
148. Id. ¶ 1, 329 P.3d at 755-56.
149. Lockett 3, 2014 OK 33, ¶ 15, 356 P.3d 58, 61 (per curium) (mem. opin.) (deciding
to issue a stay of execution).
150. See Lockett 2, ¶ 1, 329 P.3d at 755 (describing the procedural history of the case);
see also Lockett 3, ¶¶ 4-8, 356 P.3d at 59-60 (also detailing the procedural history).
151. Lockett 3, ¶ 6, 356 P.3d at 59-60 (noting that the execution date for one of the
petitioners was set at the time for April 22, note also that this memorandum opinion finally
deciding to grant a stay was decided on April 21).
152. See Inefficient, supra note 146.
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jurisdiction still represented a period where litigants were spending time
and money on issues not related to the merits of their case. 153
Furthermore, the analysis to this point has only centered on the parties to
the litigation, and said nothing of the systemic effects. The judicial system
is necessarily one of finite resources as there are only so many judges,
courtrooms, and hours in a day. 154 Therefore, each time that a jurisdictional
dispute is prolonged in this manner, time is being spent that could be going
to other parties with meritorious claims. And while this wrong is grave in
economic terms, it also has constitutional implications. As the Oklahoma
Supreme Court recognized in Lockett, the Oklahoma Constitution demands
that the courts shall provide a “certain remedy . . . without . . . delay” to
“every person . . . for every wrong.” 155 This certainly seems to imply that
delivering justice in a timely and efficient manner is a constitutional
guarantee to the citizens of the state.
This is not to say that resolving this particular problem entails a solution.
In fact, it may be impossible to always provide an outcome that is optimal
from both a structural and efficiency perspective in any certain terms. 156
Yet, if there is an acceptable solution from a structural standpoint that is
more efficient, then the inefficient aspects of the current state of
jurisdictional determinations—and their effects on the entire system—
cannot be ignored.157
B. Control of the Litigants
In civil litigation, forum selection is frequently regarded as the most
important strategic decision that a party will make. 158 This importance goes
beyond the mere geographic location of the court and extends to
determining what substantive and procedural law will apply. 159 These
considerations are particularly relevant here, as whether a party ends up
before the Oklahoma Supreme Court or the Oklahoma Court of Criminal

153. See Lockett 2, ¶ 1, 329 P.3d at 755-56 (describing the procedural history of the
case); see also Lockett 3, ¶¶ 4-8, 356 P.3d at 59-60 (also detailing the procedural history).
154. McIntyre v. K-Mart Corp., 794 F.2d 1023, 1026 (5th Cir. 1986).
155. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6 (emphasis added); Lockett 3, ¶ 11, 356 P.3d at 61 (quoting
OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6).
156. Buehler, supra note 123, at 667 (describing structural and efficiency values as
incommensurable, and thus impossible to analyze from a cost-benefit perspective).
157. Id. at 665-66.
158. Paul Rosenthal, Improper Joinder: Confronting Plaintiffs’ Attempts to Destroy
Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 49, 55 (2009).
159. Id.
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Appeals will dictate whether Oklahoma civil or criminal procedure
applies. 160
There are many varying perspectives on exactly how much control
litigants should have to select their forum. 161 It seems to be a fundamental
matter of fairness, however, that, as much as possible, parties should be
able to foresee the effects of certain actions that they take in their case. That
is, even if they cannot cherry-pick which court will hear their case, litigants
should not be totally in the dark about where they should file an appeal.
For example, imagine an individual who has been convicted of a crime in
Oklahoma and believes she has an appeal on some civil claim regarding her
trial or conviction. The individual takes her case to an attorney who has vast
experience arguing such claims before the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The
attorney agrees that the supreme court is the proper forum for the case to be
decided; in fact, it has decided such cases before. To the attorney’s surprise,
however, the supreme court decides this time that the court of criminal
appeals should have jurisdiction over the matter. 162 Now, much of the
preparation to appear before the supreme court has gone to waste, not to
mention the very real possibility that the attorney has never appeared before
the court of criminal appeals before, leaving the client in a particularly
awkward and frustrating situation (and potentially raising ethical
considerations for the attorney). 163 While this situation always remains a
potential outcome, it should be limited as much as possible so that parties
can have certainty in results, which in turn will allow them to make better
decisions regarding their cases.
C. Rule of Law
Concededly, the phrase “rule of law” has become somewhat of a loaded
term. 164 Attempts to reconcile conceptions of the term with modern legal
160. See State ex rel. Coats v. Hunter, 1978 OK CR 57, ¶ 3, 580 P.2d 158, 159 (stating
that the law of civil procedure does not apply to habeas corpus proceedings, which are
considered criminal in Oklahoma).
161. See generally Rosenthal, supra note 158.
162. Recall, “a hard-and-fast rule would not serve the ends of justice.” Movants to Quash
Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoena v. Dixon, 2008 OK 36, n.1, 184 P.3d 546, 548-49.
163. See Hunter, ¶ 3, 580 P.2d at 159 (stating that the law of civil procedure does not
apply to habeas corpus proceedings, which are considered criminal in Oklahoma); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
164. See Richard H. Fallon, “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1997) (describing invocations of the Rule of Law as
often “smug or hortatory,” and as increasingly having “acquired either defensive or
accusatory tones”); Major Tonya L. Jankunis, Military Strategists Are from Mars, Rule of
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and political underpinnings, however, are beyond the scope of this article.
Here, it is sufficient to note that the Rule of Law embodies an ideal that
serves three primary purposes, as proposed by Richard Fallon. 165 First, the
Rule of Law stands as a dike between civilization and anarchy. 166 Second,
the Rule of Law allows individuals to have enough predictive information
about a society in order to arrange their affairs.167 And finally, the Rule of
Law, to some extent, protects against “official arbitrariness.” 168 That is, at
its core, the Rule of Law stands in direct juxtaposition to the “rule of men”
in order that “those applying the law, as much as those to whom it is
applied, can be bound by it.” 169 Further, Fallon proposes five elements that
must be present in order to realize the ideals of the Rule of Law.170 They are
as follows:
1) The first element is the capacity of legal rules, standards, or
principles to guide people in the conduct of their affairs. People
must be able to understand the law and comply with it.
2) The second element of the Rule of Law is efficacy. The law
should actually guide people, at least for the most part. In Joseph
Raz's phrase, “people should be ruled by the law and obey it.”
3) The third element is stability. The law should be reasonably
stable, in order to facilitate planning and coordinated action over
time.
4) The fourth element of the Rule of Law is the supremacy of legal
authority. The law should rule officials, including judges, as well
as ordinary citizens.
5) The final element involves instrumentalities of impartial justice.
Courts should be available to enforce the law and should employ
fair procedures.171

Law Theorists Are from Venus: Why Imposition of the Rule of Law Requires a GoldwaterNichols Modeled Interagency Reform, 197 MIL. L. REV. 16, 29 (2008) (noting that “[t]he
rule of law has become ubiquitous to the point of becoming slippery”).
165. Fallon, supra note 164, at 7-8.
166. Id. at 7.
167. Id. at 7-8.
168. Id. at 8.
169. Id. at 3.
170. Id. at 8-9.
171. Id. (quoting Joseph Rax, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF
LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210, 224 (1979)).
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In applying these elements to Oklahoma, it appears the current system
comes up short. As for the first and second elements, the supreme court’s
jurisprudence lacks clear standards and thus does not guide decision
making. 172 Third, the law does not allow for planning and coordination of
activities. 173 Fourth, it would seem that the current system does not control
judges because decisions are made independent of any other standard,
which gives the appearance of arbitrariness, at a minimum. 174 Finally, the
fifth element is at least partially not met as courts may potentially be
unavailable to litigants with meritorious claims. 175
Even so, it would be the most uncouth of hyperboles to suggest that the
issue discussed in this article risks the collapse of Rule of Law in Oklahoma
entirely. Moreover, reasonable minds can differ in consideration of the
effects of such principles in any instance.176 Nevertheless, these concerns,
when combined with those of efficiency and control of litigants, are severe
enough that they need to be protected from erosion, however slight,
wherever possible.
V. Solutions
In analyzing options to resolve some of these issues, potential solutions
can be categorized by the actor that must engage in them. Here, the saving
grace must either come from the hand of the state legislature or that of the
state judiciary. While legislative options are worth considering, action by
the judiciary seems to be the best solution, as argued further below.
A. Legislative Options
If the legislature acts, it has three basic courses available to follow: (1)
dissolve the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, (2) change the structure
of the relationship between the court of criminal appeals and the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, or (3) further define through statute what is criminal and
what is civil. Each of these has some appeal, but also some drawbacks.

172. See Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury v. Dixon, 2008 OK 36, n.1, 184 P.3d
546, 548-49.
173. See supra Section IV.B.
174. See supra Part II.
175. See supra Part III (Scenario Seven).
176. Fallon, supra note 164, at 9 (stating that there is disagreement as to what sorts of
departures from the Rule of Law are objects of concern, also noting that even a generally
effective legal system can include regulations or decisions that do not comply with the Rule
of Law).
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First, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals could be dissolved
entirely. While this seems an unlikely option, it would actually not take a
great amount of action on the part of the legislature. Recall that the court of
criminal appeals was created by statute, not the state constitution.177 While
the constitution recognizes the court of criminal appeals, it only grants the
court equal appellate jurisdiction with the supreme court “until otherwise
provided by statute.” 178 Therefore, all the legislature would have to do is
amend or repeal title 20, section 40 of the Oklahoma Statutes, resulting in
Oklahoma having one intermediate court of appeal and one court of last
resort—putting it in line with the vast majority of other states in that
respect. 179 If this course of action were followed, the problems created by
the gap in appellate jurisdiction between the two courts would be
completely eliminated as the supreme court would be the single, ultimate
judicial authority in Oklahoma, removing the possibility of disagreement
between it and the court of criminal appeals.180
Of course, the court of criminal appeals has greater utility than that
solution would suggest. It provides specialization in addition to relieving
some of the supreme court’s case load, purposes which are beneficial and
not to be taken lightly. Moreover, the mere fact that Oklahoma is somewhat
unique in this structure is by no means enough to justify changing it—after
all, states are to be laboratories of democracy. 181 Further, the switching
costs of transferring the entire docket of the court of criminal appeals would
be significant. To mention just a few of the abundant headaches that could
result, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals and supreme court may not
have the infrastructure to deal with the influx on their dockets; variances in
procedural timelines and rules would have to be accounted for; litigants in
pending cases would have to make numerous adjustments to logistics and
potentially to strategy as well. Therefore this solution—although perhaps
intriguing and definitely effective—seems overbroad.
Second, similar to the previous option, the legislature could amend the
statute that created the court of criminal appeals to change its status from a

177. 20 OKLA. STAT. § 40 (2011); see supra Part II.
178. See OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4; supra Part II.
179. See State Court Organization, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, http://data.ncsc.
org/QvAJAXZfc/opendoc.htm?document=Public%20App/SCO.qvw&host=QVS@qlikviewi
sa&anonymous=true (last visited Feb. 26, 2017).
180. See supra Section III.C.
181. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that denial of the right of the states to experiment in economic and
social issues might be costly).
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co-equal superior court to an inferior court underneath the umbrella of the
supreme court, on a level equal with the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals.
This would simply create alternate paths that an appeal could travel before
reaching the supreme court. Such a system is similar to that adopted by
Alabama and is therefore not without precedent.182 This solution would also
eliminate issues with the current system in that the supreme court would
have coextensive jurisdiction with the court of criminal appeals while also
clearly being the superior court. That is, the supreme court would have
authority to hear every case, whether or not the court of criminal appeals
did. Therefore, regardless of whether a litigant’s case would be heard at the
intermediate level by the court of civil appeals or the court of criminal
appeals, it would clearly be able to be heard by the supreme court. Again,
this would eliminate issues by removing the potential for disagreements
over jurisdiction between the two courts. 183
This solution seems more effective than dissolving the court of criminal
appeals entirely. It would limit—albeit not eliminate—some of the
switching costs and would still allow for maximization of the court of
criminal appeals’ specialization, just at a different stage in the process.
Such a solution may be a less efficient distribution, however, as it would
still increase the supreme court’s docket and would still have some amount
of switching costs.
Moreover, as was the problem with dissolving the court of criminal
appeals entirely, the problems of efficiency, control of the litigants, and
Rule of Law are not necessarily inherent in a system of two courts of last
resort. The problem is not necessarily that Oklahoma has such a system, but
the way it implements such a system. The structure is not entirely meritless
in and of itself. Therefore, this solution is also overbroad in that it
unnecessarily changes the entire system.
Third, the legislature could amend title 20, section 40 of the Oklahoma
Statutes, which gives the court of criminal appeals broad jurisdiction over
“criminal cases,” 184 to include a definition of that term. This would provide
more consistency by at least giving a baseline to determine in which court a
particular issue belongs. This solution rightfully does not entirely remove
decision-making authority from the judiciary, however, as no matter how
particular the legislature believes its definition is, there will necessarily be
182. See ALA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 140-141 (creating a Supreme Court with the highest
authority but also the intermediate courts of civil and criminal appeals with jurisdiction set
by law and rules of the Supreme Court).
183. See supra Section III.C.
184. 20 OKLA. STAT. § 40 (2011).
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some level of ambiguity that must be resolved through an interpretation by
the supreme court. 185 This still represents an improvement by adding some
articulable standard outside of the judiciary that the supreme court can be
held to, thus making it harder for the court to silently violate the
constitution. 186 There would still remain, however, issues with the supreme
court’s jurisprudence on its own. Therefore, this solution would narrow the
magnitude of the problem, but not entirely eliminate it.
Texas provides an example of a clearer structure for determining
jurisdiction between two courts. Texas also has a supreme court and a court
of criminal appeals that are courts of last resort.187 As in Oklahoma, the
Supreme Court of Texas has jurisdiction over all cases, except for criminal
law matters. 188 Similarly, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has
jurisdiction in all criminal matters.189 But while the Texas Constitution does
not directly say how conflicts between the two courts are to be handled, it
still drastically narrows the potential for conflicts by its structure. First,
generally all appeals, civil or criminal, are handled by the intermediate
courts of appeals. 190 Any further issues in a civil matter will then go before
the Texas Supreme Court. 191 In a criminal matter, the appeal will be to the
court of criminal appeals, which the court can accept or deny at its
discretion. 192 Further, the court of criminal appeals may issue an order on
its own to review the decision of the court of appeals.193
This one feature eliminates the potential for the two courts to disagree
about jurisdiction, which is one problem with Oklahoma’s current
system. 194 In effect, this means that the court of criminal appeals cannot be
forced to take any cases it does not want to hear, either by the parties to a
case or by the Supreme Court of Texas. Of the suboptimal scenarios
discussed in Part II, this feature alone eliminates the potential for three of
the five suboptimal scenarios—specifically Scenarios Five, Six, and Seven.
Those three scenarios, all involving one court being forced to hear a case it
previously stated it did not have jurisdiction over, are now impossible for
two reasons. First, it is impossible for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See In re M.B., 2006 OK 63, ¶ 8, 145 P.3d 1040, 1044-45; supra Part II.
See supra Part III.
See State Court Organization, supra note 179.
TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3(a).
Id. § 5(a).
Id. § 6(a).
Id. § 3(a).
Id. § 5(b).
Id.
See supra Section III.C.
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to have to deny having jurisdiction of a case, since it can only move to take
cases it has already established it has jurisdiction over.195 Second, unlike
Oklahoma, even if the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals did theoretically
determine it did not have jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Texas does not
have the opportunity to attempt to force jurisdiction upon it. 196
Additionally, the Texas Constitution states that an appeal can bypass the
court of appeals and go directly to the court of criminal appeals if the case
is one “in which the death penalty has been assessed.”197 While the point of
this section is presumably to eliminate some bureaucratic red tape by
creating a fast track for death-penalty cases, the effect is clear that if the
death penalty has been assessed in the underlying case, then the appeal
clearly belongs in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. The combination
of these two facets of the Texas Constitution creates a limited potential for
jurisdictional conflicts.
The possibility remains, however, that the supreme court will try to take
an appeal of what is actually a criminal case or that the court of criminal
appeals will move to hear what is actually a civil case (Scenarios Two and
Four as discussed in Part III). Of course, if a court wants to act
unconstitutionally and take a case that it does not have jurisdiction over,
little can be done about it at the time. The effect can only be retroactive in
not giving force, precedential or otherwise, to the opinion.198 A greater
danger, however, lies in the close cases where it is not entirely clear which
court has jurisdiction. Therefore, the more cases where jurisdiction is
unclear, the greater the danger. And while these cases can perhaps never
entirely be eliminated, they can be narrowed by the creation of an
ascertainable standard, something the Texas Constitution has done for
death-penalty cases.
B. Judicial Options
Because of the preceding, the most effective answer has to come from
the judiciary itself, as it is the heart of the problem. Specifically, as shown
above in Part II, the supreme court relies on an ad hoc approach to deciding
whether it or the court of criminal appeals should have jurisdiction,

195. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5(b).
196. See OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
197. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5(b).
198. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 450 (Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass’n ed.,
2009); see also supra Part III.
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deciding each time on a “case-by-case basis.” 199 Such an approach is based
in flexibility, allowing the law to be formed and changed as needed, and is
regularly identified as the American way of solving legal issues.200 While
effective in many situations, it is not the only path, nor is it necessarily
always the right path to take. 201 In addition to flexibility, competing norms
of consistency and predictability are also necessary to effective lawmaking
as they too are essential to basic underpinnings of fairness, and indeed in
certain situations are even paramount to flexibility. 202 Laws with these latter
characteristics, however, cannot be achieved through ad hoc decision
making, but require clear, articulable standards.203 The effective jurist
therefore recognizes the need for both sorts of law making—ad hoc
decisions and intelligible standards—to be available in his toolbox. The
difficulty comes in determining which instances call for the implementation
of what type of rule.
For example, Professor Roger Dworkin argues that the flexible nature
developed by the Supreme Court of the United States in its Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence is inappropriate for those circumstances. 204
Primarily, this is because police search and seizure techniques are not
everyday occurrences and can hardly be expected to be easily attainable to
the general public. 205 Therefore, if the judiciary attempts to make these
decisions without any sort of hard standard, there is “a void into which
attempts to influence are bound to rush.”206 That is, it is possible for ad hoc
decisions not grounded in reasonableness to become decided more on the
whims of judges rather than sound legal reasoning. 207 Moreover, while
remedies of police atrocities is the purpose of the due process clause, the

199. Movants to Quash Multicounty Grant Jury Subpoena v. Dixon, 2008 OK 36, ¶ 7,
184 P.3d 546, 548.
200. Roger B. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits
of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 364-65 (1973).
201. See id. at 365 (noting that “the utility of [factual adjudication] has limits”).
202. Id.
203. The Oklahoma Supreme Court itself implicitly recognizes this dichotomy, it simply
comes out the other way, arguing that in this situation, a case-by-case determination is
appropriate because “a hard and fast rule would not serve the ends of justice.” Dixon, ¶ 7,
n.1, 184 P.3d at 549.
204. Dworkin, supra note 200, at 365.
205. Id. at 366.
206. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 104 (1967).
207. See LeMoyne-Owen Coll. v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 55, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (describing
how, in the context of administrative agencies, over-flexible standards such as the “totality
of the circumstances" test can turn into rationalizing whatever decision the agency desires).
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purpose of search and seizure law under the Fourth Amendment is to
control police conduct, forcing them to respect individual rights. 208
Therefore, if that goal is to be attainable, there is a natural need for
predictable and consistent norms to which police can actually conform their
conduct, a situation that cannot be reached through ad hoc decision
making. 209
So, the question then becomes whether the ad hoc, case-by-case
jurisprudence adopted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court is appropriate in
determining whether a claim is civil or criminal. Based on the factors
examined above, it does not seem to be. First, consider the nature of the
acts involved. Defining whether a legal issue is criminal or civil seems to be
inherently conceptual. Unlike negligence, it is not something we can
measure based on common, everyday experiences. Rather, it is a legal
construct created to better categorize and understand different types of legal
problems. Therefore, there is a greater danger with ad hoc decisions that the
tail will wag the dog, meaning that a court will decide whether it wants
jurisdiction over a case or not, and then will create whatever rule is
necessary to make the particular facts criminal or civil as desired.
Moreover, while perhaps the designation of criminal or civil in itself is not
an important issue, it has profound impacts on the efficiency of the case and
the situations of the parties.210
Secondly, the nature of what the law is trying to accomplish also pushes
away from ad hoc decision making. In distinguishing between civil and
criminal to determine jurisdiction, courts clearly are not providing a remedy
to right a past wrong, as in negligence. Instead, jurisdictional arguments are
somewhat extra-litigation as they are outside the context of the merits of the
case. Therefore, since the common conception is that jurisdictional disputes
should be limited as much as possible, 211 this leads even more strongly to
the idea that there should be a clear standard rather than ad hoc decision
making here. Without a clear standard, ad hoc decision making usually
leads to more issues being litigated, as it is easier to find potential

208. Dworkin, supra note 200, at 365-66.
209. Id.
210. See supra Part IV.
211. See Buehler, supra note 123, at 679-80 (arguing that jurisdictional litigation has
value in deterring other parties from transcending jurisdictional boundaries and promoting
values of federalism and separation of powers; when these values are not present, such
litigation is inefficient).
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ammunition for any legal argument. 212 And while this is a good thing when
remedies are being provided because the law seeks to provide remedies for
those who deserve them, in the jurisdictional situation, the incentive is in
the opposite direction: to limit disputes.213 Therefore, a clearer standard
would better achieve this goal by eliminating some potential arguments,
thus making jurisdictional lines clearer and enhancing the ability to focus
on the merits of the case. 214 This is especially true when, as in Lockett, the
death penalty is on the line and the defendant in the original case has
nothing to lose and everything to gain by extending the case for as long as
possible. Moreover, the supreme court is trying to control conduct at some
level, even though it is just the conduct of itself and the court of criminal
appeals, rather than a third party. Put differently, jurisdiction is power and
the power of the courts needs to be legitimate to enhance Rule of Law
principles. 215 Therefore, it makes more sense to make those decisions based
on an ascertainable standard, especially when one of the potential
beneficiaries is the party making the decisions.
For such standards, two basic options provide workable solutions to
determine jurisdiction. The heart of the problem with Oklahoma’s current
jurisprudence is not that it has failed to recognize either of these solutions,
but that through its ad hoc decision making it has employed them both
haphazardly on different occasions. First, if the appeal arises out of or
relates back to a case that was prosecuted by the State, then the appeal
belongs in the court of criminal appeals.216 Such a standard would be easy
to apply. If an appeal to a higher court involves a stay or injunction, it is
unclear on its surface and could go either way. If in the underlying case,
however, the injunction references a nuisance claim from one private
citizen against another private citizen, or even against the government, then
that appeal would clearly be a civil case that belongs in the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma. But, if in the underlying case the injunction references a
private citizen being prosecuted by the government for a violation of the
criminal code of Oklahoma, then it is very intuitively a criminal case and
belongs in the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.
212. See Dworkin, supra note 200, at 367 (arguing that, in the Fourth Amendment
context, “adopting forthright, inflexible rules . . . may avoid much useless, expensive, and
frustrating litigation engendered by the current chaos, which appears to offer hope of
escaping conviction to countless criminals”).
213. See Buehler, supra note 123, at 679-80.
214. See Dworkin, supra note 200, at 367.
215. See supra Part IV.
216. Similar to that used in the In re M.B. line of cases. See supra Part II.
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One potential argument against such an approach is that it puts too much
weight on the criminal side of the scale. In one sense, this would give more
power to the court of criminal appeals, as it would potentially have the
ability to hear more cases than it currently does. The standard is not
overbroad, however, in the sense that anything with a hint of criminality
would automatically get shipped to the court of criminal appeals by default.
For example, imagine a citizen of Oklahoma charged with murder. As a
part of his defense, the citizen seeks to exclude evidence on the grounds
that a search by the police violated Oklahoma search and seizure law.
Separately, the citizen also brings some sort of due process claim against
the police for that same violation. On appeal of the former case, the legal
issue would arise out of the actual trial prosecuting the citizen for murder.
Therefore, it would be criminal. But, the latter appeal would not merely get
swept up in the criminality just because it is related to the same set of
factual circumstances. Rather, the due process claim would be civil because
even if the government had never prosecuted the citizen, he would still have
access to the due process cause of action for the potentially illegal search.
Therefore, it is independent, does not arise from the prosecution, and is a
civil case, thus belonging in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Applied to
Lockett, this standard would greatly enhance clarity. Lockett and Warner’s
appeals both arose out of criminal prosecutions, and therefore would be
under the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. 217
The second available solution is to examine whether the appeal itself
actually asserts a civil or criminal right. 218 This solution achieves a more
balanced distribution of cases, in that more civil claims would end up
before the supreme court and more criminal claims would be distributed to
the court of criminal appeals. This same feature would also increase the
specialization benefits of having two courts of last resort. Using the same
example as above, the outcome would be the same, albeit for different
reasons. The due process claim would still find its way onto the docket of
the supreme court because it asserts a civil right, while the court of criminal
appeals would still preside over the challenge to the search and seizure
provision, as that is a criminal right.
One problem with this solution is that, while it works well in easy areas,
it does less in tougher cases. Defining something as a civil or criminal right
makes sense for those rights that one commonly thinks of in those terms,

217. See Warner v. State, 2006 OK CR 40, ¶ 2, 144 P.3d 838, 856; Lockett 1, 2002 OK
CR 30, ¶ 1, 53 P.3d 418, 421.
218. Similar to that used in the Dancy line of cases. See supra Part II.
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but for something more questionable, or for a novel question that has not
yet been put into one of those categories, this method uses the term
attempted to be defined in the definition itself. Thus, some inherent
ambiguity persists.
Further, even in clearer cases, this approach creates difficulties when an
appeal includes more than one type of right. In this instance, it becomes
unclear whether the case should be split or stay together. The supreme court
was faced with this question in Lockett, as the appeal regarding the
confidentiality of the state’s death-penalty procedures seemed to assert a
civil right, but the claim for a stay of injunction appeared to assert a
criminal right. 219 In Lockett, the supreme court decided to split the cases,
holding on to the civil constitutional claim while transferring the criminal
request for an injunction to the court of criminal appeals. 220 This proved
problematic, however, as the court of criminal appeals was put in the
interesting situation of having to hear a case for a remedy without being
able to hear the underlying case. That is, how could it grant or deny a stay
of execution without making an implicit statement about the merits of the
inmates’ civil appeal, which was not before it to decide?221 The other
solution, to keep the claims together, is no more appealing. In that case, the
supreme court would be put in the unenviable position of deciding whether
the appeal was more civil or more criminal, in effect trying to determine
which issue is more important—a determination that could hardly be
objectively made.
Because of these issues, it seems that the former standard could be more
effective. Either standard employed consistently, however, will capture the
benefits of increased stability and efficacy in the appellate structure.
Therefore, more important than which standard is chosen, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court should realize that commitment to a singular, articulable
standard instead of its current ad hoc approach will enhance the
predictability and consistency of its jurisprudence.
VI. Conclusion
Gaps currently exist within the system of appellate jurisdiction in
Oklahoma and that will likely always be the case. But here, a step in the
right direction may be taken at a relatively small cost. If the standard
advocated here existed during the appeals of Lockett and Warner, the
219. Lockett 3, 2014 OK 33, ¶ 3, 356 P.3d 58, 59 (per curium) (mem. opin.).
220. Id. ¶ 8, 356 P.3d at 60.
221. Lockett 2, 2014 OK CR 3, ¶ 2, 329 P.3d 755, 756-57.
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situation would have been clear. As the appeal arose from the prosecution
of both men, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals would clearly have
had the authority to issue the stays necessary to hear the appeals on the
merits. Over two months of labor, anxiety, and judicial resources would
have been saved. Such a step, however slight, would increase the
efficiency, efficacy, and respectability of the legal system in Oklahoma.
Jonathan Bryant
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